Introduction
There have been substantial changes reported by companies in their 2009 proxy statements following an unprecedented drop in stock prices. This study reviewed 200 of the largest companies (by market capitalization) that comprise the S&P 500 Stock Index. We reviewed "forward looking" statements with regard to changes in 2009, which is the focus for this study.
Surprisingly, 70 percent of companies reported changes to their 2009 executive compensation programs. These range from "minor changes" relating to salaries to "major changes" relating to short and long-term incentive programs. We also reviewed changes to severance, retirement and perquisites programs. In our study, we reviewed each proxy statement for a description of prospective changes for 2009 in response to the economic downturn and increased shareholder scrutiny.
Incentive compensation comprises the bulk of executive pay packages at publicly traded companies. Boards of directors and senior management are continually searching for the right performance measures to balance rewards with both financial and operational performance. It's a complex task, and the stakes have been raised.
In 2007, the SEC began requiring companies to disclose performance measures and goals related to executive pay programs. At the same time, many companies have been shifting the basis for their long-term incentive ("LTI") plans away from stock options to performance-based share plans.
The area of performance metrics includes multiple factors related to the alignment of pay and performance. These are crucial to the overall executive program design and should be included in the compensation philosophy. Some of the factors include:
-Changes to salary -Performance measures -LTI pay mix -Amount paid in cash immediately or amount deferred (typically in stock) -Pay for performance (minimum, target, and maximum) -Severance pay -Stock ownership guidelines
We included changes to salary and severance pay as part of performance metrics because there may be a disconnect between pay and performance. For example, an executive may receive a salary increase in the face of disastrous corporate results or get a large severance pay for failure.
Executive compensation program changes reported for 2009 appear to be primarily related to broad-based stock price drop from December 31, 2007 to February 28, 2009 . The greater the drop in stock price, the more likely it is that a company reported a change to their program. This relationship also applies to each element of compensation.
To assist in our study, we categorized changes as "minor" or "major". Minor changes are related to adverse salary changes. Major changes primarily relate to short-and longterm incentive plans, but we have also included changes to severance, retirement and perquisite programs in this category as well.
Part I. Study Highlights
In general, incentive plans have changed as follows:
• A shift away from long-term incentives to include more focus on short-term incentive plans;
• Short-term incentive ("STI") plan performance measures shifted to profit and cash flow from capital efficiency;
• Long-term incentive plan performance measures shifted to capital efficiency, cash flow and total shareholder return; and
• Companies are increasing their emphasis on time-vested restricted stock ("RS") and restricted stock units ("RSUs").
Specifically, a substantial majority (70 percent) of companies that filed proxy statements disclosed changes to their executive compensation programs effective in 2009 that will impact pay levels reported in next year's proxy. Highlights of the changes are as follows:
• • Only two companies have experienced an increase in stock price (Amgen Inc and Walgreen Co).
• 70 companies had a stock price drop of between 40 percent and 60 percent.
• The median stock price change is negative 49 percent, or in other words, the typical company in this study lost about half of its value from 12/31/07 through the period leading up to the filing of the proxy statement.
For the purpose of this study we made a distinction between minor and major changes disclosed by 191 companies that have reported for 2009 (9 companies have yet to report by the effective date of this study). Because the typical mix of pay at the NEO level is skewed toward incentive compensation, we separated the changes with regard to the overall impact on total pay. Our categorization is as follows:
• "Minor changes" denote changes concerning base salary (e.g., freeze or reduction).
• "Major changes" relate to short-and long-term incentive plan changes as well as changes to severance, retirement and perquisite programs.
• No changes.
Part III. Findings
Overall, incentive trends can be summarized as follows:
• Overall, there has been a move away from long-term incentives and a shift toward short-term incentive plans, • Short-term incentive plan performance measures shifted to profit and cash flow from capital efficiency, • Long-term incentive plan performance measures shifted to capital efficiency, cash flow and total shareholder return, and • Companies are emphasizing time-vested restricted stock and RSUs.
Specifically, 70 percent of companies that filed proxy statements by our deadline disclosed changes to their executive compensation programs effective in 2009 that will impact pay levels reported in next year's proxy. Highlights of the changes are as follows:
• Eliminated merit increases for 2009 (43 percent)
• Froze or reduced base salaries for 2009 (13 percent)
• Adjusted long-term incentive grants (e.g., awarding the same number of shares regardless of value, decreasing the value of awards, or changing the mix of award types) (39 percent) • Adjusted short-term incentive program (e.g., moving to discretionary plans, widening payout ranges/decreasing thresholds, decreasing maximums) or applying negative discretion for bonus payouts (25 percent)
• Changed various other elements of compensation (e.g., changing CIC benefits, eliminating tax gross-ups on perquisites, reducing retirement benefits) (15 percent)
• Modified CEO's change-in-control benefits (e.g., reducing the severance multiple) 4 (4 percent)
Who is Changing their Executive Compensation Program?
As you may expect, companies who experienced large stock price drops tended to report changes to their executive compensation program, particularly regarding salary freezes and salary reductions as well as changes to incentive plans. Accordingly, 70 percent of 191 companies have reported changes for 2009. These changes are closely related to the overall drop in stock price, particularly for companies experiencing an approximate 50% or greater decline in value. There are five elements to compensation, which are as follows:
• Base salary, including cost of living, merit and promotional increases;
• Short-term incentives, including changes to Pay for Performance Curve, performance measures, and forms of payout; • Long-term incentives, including changes to Pay for Performance Curve, performance measures, and types of programs;
• Benefits and perquisites, including basic benefits, SERPs, retirement, personal use of aircraft, financial counseling and other excess benefit plans; and • Severance, including severance with or without a CIC, death, disability and other.
For this study, we categorized changes to base salary as minor and all other changes as major.
Changes to Base Salary
This category of change only includes base salary. Approximately one-half of all companies reduced or froze salaries or eliminated merit increases with regard to base salaries (49 percent). A breakdown of changes to salaries is as follows:
• Eliminated merit increases for 2009 (43 percent), • Froze salaries (7 percent), and • Reduced executive salaries with a median salary cut of 10 percent (6 percent). Of these 12 companies, 8 applied the cut to all the top-executives (typically, the "Named Executive Officers") and 4 applied it to the CEO only.
Changes to Incentive Plans
In our study, we categorized three different types of major changes:
• Changes to the STI Plan (25 percent) including changes to performance measures, goals, target bonus opportunities and pay for performance curves, • Changes to the LTI Plan (39 percent) including changes to LTI mix, performance measures, grants, cash plans, performance periods or goals, and • Changes to severance, perquisites or retirement plans (15 percent).
Overall, there has been a shift away from long-term incentives and more focus on shortterm incentive plans.
While performance measures have been emphasized in short-and long-term incentives, the LTI incentive has been substantially reduced, resulting in a larger percentage of compensation associated with the short-term incentive plan. The reasons for this shift are three-fold:
• More focus on short-term cash flow, • More variability and less predictability for longer-term financial results, and • The difficulty to provide the same LTI incentive value in 2009 when the stock price has been cut in half while the STI target value has remained about the same as 2008.
Changes to Short-Term Incentive Plans
One-fourth of all companies changed their STI plan in 2009. A summary of these changes is as follows:
• Changed the weights of their performance measures (13 percent). The emphasis on STI performance measures was increased 32 times and decreased 22 times for a net increase in emphasis of 10. (See Chart III-4.)
• Other modifications to their STI plan such as changes to (i) target bonus opportunities or (ii) to the pay for performance curve (10% percent).
• Introduced intermediate or mid-performance period goals (2 percent).
• Cancelled the STI plan for 2009 (one company or less than 1 percent). On the other hand, in these difficult times, capital efficiency as a performance measure has declined in importance. Hence, the Return on Equity ("ROE") weight has been decreased by three companies (15 percent of the reported decreases). For example, Public Service Enterprise Group (NYSE: PEG) has replaced ROE by EPS.
Ten percent of companies (20 companies) made other changes to their 2009 STI program, such as changing their performance curve or their target bonus opportunities. 
Changes to Long-Term Incentive Plans
Changes to the LTI Plan (74 companies) include changes to LTI mix, performance measures, grants, cash plans, performance periods or goals.
The majority of reported changes impact LTI plans (39 percent). A breakdown of the changes is as follow:
• Shifts in LTI mix (17 percent), • Change in LTI performance measures (9 percent)-see Chart III-7, • Reduction of LTI grants (7 percent) with a median decrease of 15% in value. The reductions typically apply to all NEOs (all but two cases), Total Shareholder Return weight continues to increase in LTI plans. It has been added by six companies and represents 32 percent of the reported increases. Overall, the emphasis in LTI programs appears to be on capital efficiency, cash flow and TSR.
Change in LTI Mix 17 percent of companies have changed their LTI mix with the pronounced effect resulting in a move from stock options to restricted shares and units. Reduced their severance package (e.g., reduced their severance multiple, CIC payments or eliminated their tax gross-up) (4 percent), Eliminated perquisites or cancelled their tax gross-ups associated with payment of perquisites that result in imputed income (9 percent), Modified their retirement plans (e.g., suspension of contributions to the 401(k), frozen or eliminated SERP benefits ) (3 percent), and Introduced clawback policies that will cancel or recoup incentive awards if executive officers engage in bad behavior of various types (3 percent).
Chart III-10 Changes in LTI mix

Summary
Our findings show:
(i) Greater focus on short-term cash flow results which is counter to the direction suggested by the U.S. Treasury, academics and other expert advisers regarding ways to mitigate risk, which is to encourage a long-term perspective by subjecting more compensation to stock price risk; and (ii) More reliance on restricted stock and restricted stock units which is not performance-based as it vests simply with the passage of time.
We suggest that companies consider:
(a) Rebalancing their short-and long-term incentive target opportunity levels which may result in (x) a reduction of STI levels, or (y) a combination of reduction of STI levels and a slight increase in LTI levels; (b) Change the LTI mix away from restricted stock (or units) to a more performancebased award program; and (c) Revise the pay for performance curves for both short-and long-term incentive plans by reducing maximum payout levels.
These changes collectively will better align corporate risk, corporate performance and executive pay.
Companies strive to balance risk vs. reward vs. corporate performance. Recent proposed legislation and SEC rules changes will require companies to discuss corporate risk with regard to executive compensation. Each company needs to determine the executive compensation program that is right for them taking into account the various types of risk.
There are various types of risk that need to be addressed. Here are a few of the risks:
• Setting the wrong goals which may substantially impair the company and not create value; • Paying too much compensation that is not closely connected to performance (e.g., restricted stock, guaranteed or retention bonuses, large severance payouts with our without a change-in-control, large pension entitlements, generous perquisites);
• Paying too much of the pay in incentive compensation combined with a small salary that may encourage risky behavior with either corporate strategy or financial accounting;
• Creating windfall compensation (e.g., large severance payout or extremely large bonus);
• Overpaying executives in a systematic way over a period of time which depletes the financial vitality of the company; and • Paying cash bonuses for short-term performance that turns out to be specious and ultimately causes stock price to drop over time.
There are many examples that are associated with each of these types of risks.
Suggestions for ways to reduce risk and align pay with performance:
• Increased emphasis on long-term pay: Unlike short-term incentives, long-term pay keeps management focused on the long-term value creation and protects shareholders from paying compensation based on short-term results, and at times, specious results. Subject more compensation to stock price risk: Partial (40% or more) deferral of bonus into company stock: This protects companies from paying enormous payouts for short-term spikes. Other ideas to consider to subject pay to stock price risk:
Stock ownership requirements: Requiring significant ownership in the company is a way in which management provides additional "skin in the game" and subjects wealth accumulation to stock price risk.
Hold equity until retirement: While similar to stock ownership guidelines, this prevents management from "unloading" equity during high periods of growth and reducing their link to shareholders.
• Pay Clawbacks: Protects against the generation of "bad business" that first appears to be profitable but is reversed when the economy or other factors change and ultimately is unprofitable.
• Impose caps on bonus payouts and reduce maximum payouts: When companies have unexpected and transitory growth, bonus payment should be capped. What we have learned during this financial meltdown is that companies which had enormous growth were unable to sustain that level of growth and were substantially affected by downturn.
• Careful use of perquisites: Although perquisites represent a relatively small portion of pay, they never-the-less have become a focal point of shareholders, shareholder activist groups, and media ire. No gross-ups on pay or benefits of any type.
